This is a draft syllabus, it will be updated before the first class:
Philosophy of Commitment
Instructors: Arto Laitinen, Lilian O’Brien
Location: Pinni B
Time: Thu 10-12
Our commitments to our friends and families, to joint projects, and to political causes, are the cement of the social world. And our commitments to our own plans and principles are arguably the cement of our selves. The concept of commitment is relied upon in discussions of rational choice theory (e.g. Sen 2007) and in characterizations of phenomena as diverse as what it is to assert something (e.g. Shapiro 2018) and what it is to trust (e.g. Hawley 2014). It crops up as a key concept in social ontology (e.g. Tuomela 2007, Gilbert 2014), in debates about hypocrisy (Rossi 2018) and about meaning in life (e.g. Calhoun 2018). But what is it to commit? The primary aim of this course is to come to a better understanding of the nature of commitment and the diverse roles it plays in social life. Drawing on contemporary work in the philosophy of action, metaphysics of persons, value theory, and social ontology, we will examine commitment from a number of angles. A key secondary aim of this course is to further develop skills for writing philosophy papers.
References
Calhoun, C. (2009) “What good is commitment?”, Ethics, 119(4), 613-641.
Hawley, K. (2014) “Trust, distrust, and commitment”, Noûs 48:1, 1-20.
Rossi, B. (2018) “The commitment account of hypocrisy”, Ethical Theory & Moral Practice, 21:3, 553-567.
Sen, A. (2007) “Why exactly is commitment important for rationality?” in Rationality and Commitment, edited by Fabienne Peter and Hans Bernhard Schmid, Oxford University Press.
Gilbert, M. (2014) Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. Oxford University Press.
Tuomela, R. (2007) The philosophy of sociality, Oxford University Press.
Primary Aim: Gain a better understanding of commitment.
Secondary Aim: Further develop skills of critical thinking, critical reading, philosophical writing.
Participation: Please attend the classes and be prepared to discuss the issues in class.
Readings: All of the primary readings on the syllabus should be read before the class in which they are discussed.
It is important to stay in touch with our progress in class so that you know what we are discussing on particular days.
Further suggestions for readings – secondary readings – will also be on moodle. We will add some as we proceed. I hope that you will draw on these further readings when you are writing papers.
Recommended background reading: There are many relevant entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online (excellent free resource) and on Philosophy Compass (available through the library’s online resources).
Assessment:
Participation in seminars. Each participant will give a short presentation on one of the texts (preferably in English); discuss actively; write miniessays or a longer essay.
Week 1, 18.09:
Introduction to the philosophy of commitment.
Week 2, 25.09: Planning and Valuing
Primary reading:
Excerpt from Bratman, M. 1987/1999. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, CSLI publications.
Scheffler, S. 2009. “Valuing”, in R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (eds), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon, Oxford University Press.
Secondary reading:
Bratman, M. 2018. “Intention, practical rationality, and self-governance”, reprinted in Planning, time, and self-governance, Oxford University Press.
Seidman, J. 2009. “Valuing and Caring”, Theoria 75 (4): 272-303.
** General in-class discussion of essay-writing**
Week 3, 02.10: Two Theories of Commitment
Primary reading:
Excerpt from Michael, J. 2022. The philosophy and psychology of commitment, Routledge.
Alonso, F. 2024. “A hybrid view of commitment”, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 9, ed. D. Shoemaker.
Secondary reading:
TBA
Week 4, 09.10: Commitment and Freedom
Primary reading:
Excerpt from Frankfurt, H. 1999. “Autonomy, necessity, and love”, in Necessity Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press.
Charles Taylor - What is human agency?
Secondary reading:
Williams, B. 1971. “Persons, character, and morality” in Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press.
Paul Ricoeur, excerpt from Oneself in Another.
** No class 16.10**
Week 5, 23.10: Mental States and Speech Acts
Primary Reading:
Samuel Shpall, (2014) “Moral and rational commitment”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88:1, 146-172.
Daniel W. Harris (2019) “Intention and Commitment in Speech Acts” Theoretical Linguistics 45 (1–2): 53–67.
Secondary Reading:
Robert M. Harnish (2005) “Commitments and Speech Acts” Philosophica 75 (1).
Week 6, 30.10: Reasons, obligations, and normative powers
Primary reading:
David Owens (2012) Excerpt from Shaping the normative landscape, Oxford University Press,
Joseph Raz (2022) “Normative Powers”, in The Roots of Normativity, Oxford University Press .
Secondary reading:
Ruth Chang, “Commitments, reasons, and the will”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by Russ Schafer-Landau, Oxford University Press, 2013.
Week 7, 06.11: Joint and Collective Commitment
Primary reading:
Excerpt from Gilbert, M. 2014. Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. Oxford University Press.
Herbert H. Clark 2006 “Social Actions, Social Commitments”, Roots of Human Sociality, Levison & Enfield, eds. https://web.stanford.edu/~clark/2000s/Clark,%2520H.H.%2520_Social%2520actions,%2520social%2520commitments_%25202006.pdf
Secondary Reading:
Excerpt from Sally Scholtz, Political solidarity
Raimo Tuomela, Maj Tuomela (2003) “Acting as a Group Member and Collective Commitment”, Protosociology, Volume 18/19, Pages 7-65. https://doi.org/10.5840/protosociology200318/191
**No Class 13.11**
Week 8, 20.11: Non-Phenomenological Group Minds as Centres of Commitment
Primary Reading:
Rovane, C. (1997) Excerpt from Bounds of Agency, pp. 21-26, Princeton University Press.
Pettit, P. (2003). “Groups with Minds of Their Own.” In F. Schmitt, ed., Socializing. Metaphysics (pp. 167-93). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Secondary Reading:
Hess, K. 2018. ‘The Peculiar Unity of Corporate Agents’, Collectivity, ed. Hess, Igneski & Isaacs. Rowman & Littlefield.
Week 9, 27.11: The Value of Commitment
Primary Reading:
Calhoun, C. 2009. “What good is commitment?”, Ethics, 119(4), 613-641.
Healey, R. 2023. “Breaking up and the value of commitment”, Ergo, 10:6.
Secondary Reading:
Williams, B. 1971. “Persons, character, and morality” in Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press.
Week 10, 04.12: Friendship and Partiality
Primary Reading:
Stroud, S. (2006) “Epistemic partiality in friendship”, Ethics, 116 (3):498-524.
Keller, S. (2013) Partiality, Princeton University Press.
Secondary Reading:
TBA
Week 11, 11.12: TBA
__________
Further Topics (these may be chosen either in lieu of existing topics or in free weeks)
1. Commitment and Interpersonal Recognition
Primary reading:
TBA
Secondary Reading:
TBA
2. Sen and Schelling
Commitment and Rational Choice Theory:
Sen, A. (2007) “Why exactly is commitment important for rationality?” in Rationality and Commitment, edited by Fabienne Peter and Hans Bernhard Schmid, Oxford University Press.
Excerpt from Hausman, D. 2012. Preference, value, choice, and welfare, Cambridge University Press. (excerpt)
Commitment in Negotiation:
Schelling, T. (2006) Strategies of Commitment and other essays. Harvard University Press.
3. Commitment and Self-Control
Primary Reading:
Excerpt from Holton, R. (2006) Willing, wanting, waiting. Oxford University Press.
Kennett. J. 2013. ‘Just Say No? Addiction and the Elements of Self-Control’ in Levy, N. Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience, Oxford University Press. 144-164.
Secondary Reading:
Heath, J. and Anderson, J. 2010. “Procrastination and the Extended Will”, In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 233--253.
4. Commitment for analyzing other phenomena
Hawley, K. (2014) “Trust, distrust, and commitment”, Noûs 48:1, 1-20.
Rossi, B. (2018) “The commitment account of hypocrisy”, Ethical Theory & Moral Practice, 21:3, 553-567.
Cross, A., (2022) “Aesthetic Commitments and Aesthetic Obligations”, Ergo 8: 38.
- Teacher
Lilian OBrien